State of Punjab (2003) 7 SCC 643 where this Court has reiterated the principle in the following words: “…….Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Sucha Singh & Anr. Smelling doubts for the sake of giving benefit of doubt is not the law of the land.” 14. It is true that under our existing jurisprudence in a criminal matter, we have to proceed with presumption of innocence, but at the same time, that presumption is to be judged on the basis of conceptions of a reasonable prudent man. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with sentence ‘of course, it is possible but not in the least probable,’ the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt…. The law would fail to protect the community if it permitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond a shadow of a doubt. It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 ALL ER 272: “That degree is well settled. The principle as to what degree of proof is required is stated by Lord Denning in his inimitable style in Miller v.
It is true that the prosecution is required to establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt, but that does not mean that the degree of proof must be beyond a shadow of doubt. We do not think that the appellants have made out a case for grant of any such benefit.
That brings us to the question whether the appellants could be given the benefit of doubt having regard to the nature of the evidence adduced by the prosecution against them.
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